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I. Introduction
Agencies can create policy in three ways. The rst is through case-by-case
adjudication whereby an agency brings enforcement actions against various par-
ties for violating the provisions of either a statute or a promulgated regulation
that the agency is responsible for administering. The reasoning in the agency
court's decisions in those actions establishes general rules dening what types
of behavior are in compliance with the statute or regulation.1 This type of
policy-making is analogous to the creation of common law by the courts.
The second is through rulemaking2 whereby an agency exercises leg-
islative power delegated to it by Congress. A nal rule usually represents a
balancing of competing policies that the agency believes best furthers the ob-
jectives of the statute granting the agency its legislative authority. Most regu-
lated parties voluntarily comply with the mandates of regulations because the
regulations have the force of law. However, as alluded to above, an agency oc-
casionally will have to bring an enforcement action against a regulated party
to force the party to comply with a particular regulation. Such an action is
1Case-by-case adjudication takes place as an agency adjudication whereby the agency con-
ducts its own trial-like procedure to resolve the question presented in the action. An ad-
judication constitutes a nal agency action which is subject to judicial review pursuant to
x706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. One should note that the FDA does not have an
adjudicatory branch and cannot engage in this type of policymaking.
2One should note that the FDA engages in both informal and formal rulemaking under
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. x371(a) governs when the FDA should use informal rule-
making and x371(3) governs when the FDA should use formal rulemaking. This paper focuses
only on informal rulemaking because the FDA infrequently engages in formal rulemaking.
Any reference to \rulemaking" in this paper refers to informal rulemaking unless otherwise
specied.
1either an agency adjudication subject to judicial review or a court enforcement
proceeding.
The third is through a more informal means whereby an agency em-
bodies policy in informal opinions, guideline or guidance documents, operating
manuals, or even press releases.3 This type of policy-making is the most in-
formal, meaning that it incorporates the fewest procedural protections for reg-
ulated parties. In fact, there are no procedural requirements with which an
agency must comply when generating policy in this fashion.
In the two decades following the enactment of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (\APA"),4 \licensing and rate-making proceedings, formal adjudi-
cations, as well as formal rulemakings dominated the administrative law land-
scape".5 However, those regulatory mechanisms proved to be inappropriate for
implementing the mass of new legislation passed in the late 1960's and early
1970's that sought to address health, safety, and environmental problems. In-
formal rulemaking quickly became the preferred means of instituting these new
far-reaching governmental policies.6 Its procedures were less demanding and
more democratic than those of adjudication and it made more sense to develop
3Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, Risk and the
Environment: Improving Regulatory Decision Making 106 (1993); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 60 (1995). One should
note that guidance is an informal means of regulation whereby the FDA issues statements
\advising" regulated entities on how to comply with FDA regulations and provisions of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
45 U.S.C. xx 501 et seq. (1946). The APA establishes the minimum procedures that
agencies must follow when performing their adjudicatory or rulemaking functions. The APA
divides agency actions into four categories: informal rulemaking, formal rulemaking, informal
adjudication, and formal adjudication. x553 of the APA governs informal rulemaking. xx556-
57 of the APA govern formal rulemaking and formal adjudication. x555 of the APA and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment govern informal adjudication.
5Administrative Conference of the U.S., A Guide To Federal Agency Rulemaking
ix (2d ed. 1991) (found in the Chairman's Foreword).
6Id.
2policy through broad participation rather than to derive it from the facts of
particular cases.
The Food and Drug Administration (\FDA") followed this pattern.
Prior to 1970, the FDA used primarily case-by-case court enforcement to en-
sure compliance with the policies and provisions of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (\FDCA").7 This regulatory approach worked only because
the problems and issues facing the FDA prior to 1970 were less complex and
onerous than those arising over the past-twenty ve years. As such, the FDA
changed its principle method of policymaking under the FDCA to rulemaking
in the 1970's.8
There is general consensus in the legal community on the desirability
of agency policymaking through rulemaking rather than case-by-case adjudi-
cation.9 Professor Richard Pierce summarizes the benets of rulemaking as
follows:
(1) rules provide a valuable source of decisional standards and constraints
on agency discretion; (2) rules enhance eciency by simplifying and expedit-
ing agency enforcement eorts; (3) rules enhance fairness by providing aected
members of the public easily accessible, clear notice of the demarcation be-
tween permissible and impermissible conduct and by insuring like treatment of
similarly situated individuals and rms; (4) rulemaking enhances the quality
of agency policy decisions because it focuses on the broad eects of alternative
rules and invites participation by all potentially aected groups and individuals;
(5) rulemaking enhances eciency by allowing an agency to resolve recurring is-
721 U.S.C. xx 301 et seq. (1938).
8Peter B. Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materi-
als 1236-37 (2d ed. 1991).
9R. Pierce, S. Shapiro, And P. Verkuil, Administrative Law And Process x 6.4.1 (2d
ed. 1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity
on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988
Duke L.J. 300, 308 (1988). One should note that informal regulation such as issuing advisory
letters, guidance, and guidelines is the least favored policymaking vehicle because it aords
regulated parties no procedural protections and establishes no controls on the agency's exercise
of discretion.
3sues of legislative fact once instead of relitigating such issues in numerous cases;
(6) rulemaking enhances fairness by allowing all potentially aected members
of the public to participate in the decisionmaking process that determines the
rules that apply to their conduct; and (7) rulemaking enhances the political ac-
countability and legitimacy of agency policymaking by providing the public, the
President, and the Congress advance notice of an agency's intent to make major
policy decisions and an opportunity to inuence policies ultimately chosen by
the agency.10
Thus, the modern approach to regulation taken by agencies, including the
FDA, enjoyed strong support.11 In fact, a leading commentator \proclaimed
such notice and comment procedures to be `one of the greatest inventions of
modern government"'.12
The increased use of rulemaking in the 1960's and 1970's was not with-
out its problems however. By 1969, the volume of agency rules and the range
of areas covered by those rules was enormous. In the 1970's, congressional del-
egations of authority to agencies continued in unprecedented numbers. By one
count, Congress enacted 130 laws in that decade establishing new programs
that required extensive agency rulemaking.13 Agencies soon had the power to
regulate almost all classes of environmental problems, to regulate health and
safety hazards in nearly every workplace, and to establish comprehensive con-
sumer protection regulations.14 Those delegations of regulatory authority swept
broadly across the economy, imposing signicant costs on private industry.15
As a response, all three branches of government moved to \control"
10Pierce, supra note 3, at 59-60.
11Hutt and Merrill, supra note 8, at 1236-37.
12Administrative Conference of the U.S., supra note 5, at ix (quoting from an interview
of K. Davis and W. Gellhorn by P. Verkuil in Chairman's Forward).
13Cornelius M. Kerwin, Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and
Make Policy 14 (1994).
14Id.
15Id.
4agencies' discretion to promulgate new rules and further burden the economy.
Among other things, the courts adopted expansive denitions of the \concise
general statement of basis and purpose" that must accompany every nal agency
rule. The courts also expanded the \arbitrary and capricious" standard of ju-
dicial review, thereby increasing an agency's duty to engage in reasoned deci-
sion making. Congress enacted a series of statutes requiring agencies to follow
specic procedures in addition to those found in x553 of the APA when pro-
mulgating certain types of rules. Presidential involvement in the development
of regulatory policies also increased in the 1980's and 1990's through Oce of
Management and Budget (\OMB") review of the rulemaking process.16
Commentators and agency insiders now believe that the cumulative
weight of these constraints has \ossied" the rulemaking process.17 Many agen-
cies today attempt to circumvent the rulemaking process by engaging in other
forms of policymaking, such as case-by-case adjudication or, alternatively, the
more informal types of regulation, such as issuing informal opinions, guideline
or guidance documents, operating manuals, or even press releases.18
Parts II, III, and IV of this paper describe the major burdens placed on
agency rulemaking by each branch of the government over the past thirty years,
with specic focus on the burdens that presently aect FDA rulemaking.19 Part
16Pierce, Shapiro, and Verkuil, supra note 9, at x6.4.6(d); Administrative Conference
of the U.S., supra note 5, at ix (found in the Chairman's Forward).
17Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, supra note 3, at
106-7. See also, e.g., Pierce, Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, supra note 3.
18Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, supra note 3, at
107, 109.
19An anonymous FDA source provided lists of requirements with which the FDA must
presently comply when it engages in rulemaking. From those, one set of requirements was
compiled for the purposes of this paper.
5V then analyzes the eect those burdens have had on FDA rulemaking. The
analysis will demonstrate that the additional rulemaking requirements likely
act to deter rulemaking at the agency. In conclusion, Part VI briey discusses
the type of policymaking in which FDA currently engages as an alternative to
rulemaking and describes further research to be done regarding that method of
FDA policymaking.
II. Burdens Imposed by the Judicial Branch
The APA establishes three basic procedural requirements for informal rule-
making: rst, the publication of a general notice of proposed rulemaking; sec-
ond, an opportunity for any interested party to submit a written comment about
the proposal with the proposing agency; and third, a concise statement by the
agency explaining its basis for adopting the nal rule.20 In addition, the APA
provides for judicial review of nal agency actions such as the adoption of a
nal rule. Judicial review determines \the lawfulness of a nal rule in three
respects: rst, the agency's compliance with procedural requirements; second,
its legal authority to adopt the rule; and third, the factual support for and the
rationality of the agency's judgment", otherwise known as arbitrary and capri-
cious review.21
In the late 1950's, rulemaking was an underutilized procedure and the
courts leniently enforced its requirements. Professor Peter Strauss describes:
20Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemak-
ing, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 745, 752 (1996).
21Id.
6The requirement of notice... could be satised by inclusion of \either the
terms or the substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and
issues involved"22... [a]nd the statutory requirements for ndings, that \the
agency shall incorporate in any rule it adopts a concise general statement of [its]
basis and purpose"23 was literally understood { a one or two page statement of
the agency's reasoning was [sucient].24
Judicial review became signicantly more intense in the 1970's and 1980's
in response to the substantial economic consequences of major regulation and
the absence at that time of any political institutions to control the rulemaking
process.25 As one commentator noted, judicial review \transformed the simple,
ecient notice and comment process into an extraordinary lengthy, complicated,
and expensive process".26 The changes in the notice and comment process stem
from broader judicial interpretations of the language in the APA. The new in-
terpretations of \notice", \comments", \statement of basis and purpose", and
\arbitrary and capricious" now impose substantial burdens on agency rulemak-
ing.27
225 U.S.C. x 553(b)(3).
235 U.S.C. x 553(c).
24Strauss, supra note 20, at 752-53.
25Id. at 770. According to Professor Strauss, \scholars at that time talked openly of the
judicial review process as a kind of substitute political process" and as a means of controlling
the discretion exercised by administrators who were not subject directly to the constraints of
electoral politics. Id. See also Jerry L. Mashaw and Richard A. Merrill, Administrative
Law: The American Public Law System, Cases And Materials 317-18 (2d ed. 1985).
This was especially important considering the tendency of Congress at that time to delegate
broader and more general powers to agencies, most notably in the area of \social regulation"
seeking to protect health, safety, and the environment.
26Pierce, supra note 3, at 65. During that time period, only about half of all promulgated
rules survived this new form of judicial review. Id.; Peter H. Schuck and E. Donald Elliot, To
the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 984,
1022 (1990) (during 1965, 1975, and 1984-85, reviewing courts upheld only 43.9% of agency
rules). Today, courts seldom overturn an agency rulemaking for failure to comply with the
APA's notice and comment requirements, because although the rules are more stringent than
they were in the late 1950's, they also are relatively clear and predictable, making compliance
easier for agencies. Id. at 1010. Also, Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (granting agencies the authority to interpret their own enabling
statutes) makes attacking agency rules more dicult because courts have to defer to an
agency's interpretation of its statutes.
27Kenneth C. Davis and Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise, Volume
I x 7.1 (3d ed. 1994).
7The change in the courts' perception as to what constitutes adequate
notice under x553(b) of the APA impacted how agencies approach the informal
rulemaking notice and comment process. Most challenges to the adequacy of
agency notice arise because either (1) the proposed rule and the nal rule are
so dierent that parties aected by the nal rule could not have known that the
agency was considering one of the elements of the nal rule; or (2) the agency
supported its nal rule with data that was unknown to aected parties until
the agency announced its nal rule. The same argument applies to both types
of situations: parties cannot submit meaningful comments unless the notice of
proposed rulemaking indicates the issues under consideration by the agency.28
Courts developed the \logical outgrowth" doctrine to address the rst
concern. Under this test, a court may nd notice of proposed rulemaking ade-
quate, even if the nal rule reects substantial changes from proposed rule, so
long as the nal rule is a \logical outgrowth" of the proposed rule.29 The idea
is that if the nal rule logically relates to the proposed rule then the public
should have expected a rule in the form of the nal rule, thus making the notice
adequate. This doctrine attempts to address a tension inherent in notice and
comment rulemaking. On the one hand, an agency cannot issue a nal rule
changing the state of regulation in an area where the proposed rule gives no
warning that the agency was considering such changes.30 On the other hand,
an agency's nal rule can dier substantially from the proposed rule so long as
the agency's notice warns interested parties of the possibility that those changes
28Id. at x7.3.
29See, e.g., American Medical Association v. U.S., 887 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1989).
30See Wagner Electric Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972).
8might occur.31 After all, the function of the notice and comment process is to
give the agency an opportunity to make changes in its nal rule in response to
critical comments received by the public.
The \logical outgrowth" test is amorphous and leaves to the discretion
of the reviewing court much of the decision as to what constitutes adequate
notice. The consequence of this new notice requirement is that when an agency
develops a nal rule that does not logically relate to the proposed rule, it must
reissue that rule in a notice of proposed rulemaking. The agency has to eec-
tively repeat the notice and comment process.
In response to the second concern, courts came to interpret adequate
notice as requiring an agency to include, as part of the notice of proposed rule-
making, data in the agency's possession which forms the basis of its proposed
rule.32 The courts reasoned that promulgating rules on the basis of inadequate
data or data known only to the agency is \not consonant" with the purpose of
notice and comment because there is no actual opportunity to comment on that
data.33
Further, data on which an agency bases its nal rule is by denition
relevant to the rulemaking. The lack of such data in the notice of proposed
rulemaking fails to elicit signicant comments related to the data that parties
might have made had the data been included. These comments would have
31See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974).
32See, e.g., U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977) (inval-
idating FDA rule concerning minimum time and temperature for cooking whitesh because
FDA supported its rule by referring to studies it did not mention in its notice of proposed
rulemaking); Portland Cement Ass'n. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (invali-
dating EPA rule because EPA used unpublished data to support its proposed and nal rules
which was not included in notice of proposed rulemaking).
33Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 393.
9been relevant to the rulemaking because they would have pertained to the data.
Therefore, to the extent an agency bases the nal rule on that data, the agency
fails to consider \relevant factors" in its rulemaking decision. An agency acts ar-
bitrarily and capriciously under the \hard look" doctrine described below when
it adopts a rule and fails to consider \relevant factors" in its decision.
Perhaps the greatest change in the way agencies approach informal
rulemaking stems from the development of \hard look" judicial review of nal
rules. x706(2)(A) of the APA mandates that a court set aside an agency action
when the action is arbitrary and capricious. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe34 presents the rst modern interpretation of the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review. The Court concluded that to determine whether
the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious, it must consider whether the
agency considered the \relevant factors" in its decision and whether the agency
made a \clear error of judgment" in its decision.35 The Court further stated
that although a reviewing court's inquiry into the facts must be \searching
and careful", the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency.36
The \searching and careful" standard described in Overton Park is often called
\hard look" review and reviewing courts have applied that standard of review
to agency rulemakings from the early 1970's to the present.37
34401 U.S. 402 (1971).
35Id. at 416.
36Id. One should note that Overton Park has had a lasting impact on judicial review
of rulemaking even though the agency action reviewed by the Overton Park Court was an
informal adjudication and not an informal rulemaking.
37It is important to note that \hard look" review has both procedural and substantive
aspects to it. The requirement that the agency consider \relevant factors" in its decision is
procedural because it prescribes how the agency is to proceed in making a decision. The \clear
error of judgment" prong is substantive because it allows reviewing courts to actually decide
whether the agency's decision is reasonable in light of the facts in the rulemaking record.
10A court evaluates the agency's \concise general statement of basis and
purpose" that accompanies each rule to determine whether the agency's rule-
making is arbitrary and capricious.38 Over the past twenty years, however, the
courts have applied the \hard look" review standard to agency rulemaking in
such a way that the adjectives \encyclopedic" and \detailed" have replaced the
statutory adjectives of \concise" and \general".39 As summarized by Professor
Richard Pierce:
To avoid reversal and remand of a rule, an agency must consider explicitly
the consistency of its rule with each of the many inherently inconsistent goals
Congress typically requires the agency to pursue. The agency also must consider
explicitly the issues and arguments raised in comments submitted by potentially
aected members of the public. In the case of a rulemaking to resolve a major
policy issue, those comments typically encompass tens of thousands of pages,
include numerous studies commissioned by interested parties, and raise hun-
dreds of issues. In order to avoid reversal and remand, the agency's discussion
in the statement of basis and purpose must demonstrate that the agency has
given full consideration to each issue and that it has balanced objectively each
decisional factor.40
No court today would uphold a substantial agency rule that incorporates
only a truly \concise general statement of basis and purpose" of the type read-
ily accepted by the courts in the 1950's.41 To have any reasonable chance of
38Pierce, supra note 9, at 309.
39Id. See also Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 28 Admin.
L. Rev. 363, 393 (1986).
40Pierce, supra note 9, at 309-10. See also U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568
F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that for judicial review to be meaningful, the statement of
basis and purpose should enable a court to see what policy issues the notice and comment
phase addressed and why the agency reacted to those issues the way it did).
41One should note that the Supreme Court's ruling in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (holding that courts are
not permitted to add procedures to informal rulemaking beyond those listed in x553 of the APA
through common law reasoning) does not aect \hard look" review because the requirements
of \hard look" review evolve from judicial interpretations of the arbitrary and capricious and
statement of basis and purpose provisions of the APA and do not constitute common law
additions to the procedures listed in x553 of the APA. The fact that the Supreme Court
continued to apply \hard look" review to informal rulemaking after the Vermont Yankee
decision shows that Vermont Yankee did not change \hard look" review. See, e.g., Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983).
11surviving judicial review, an agency must provide the basis and purpose of its
rule in a detailed statement meeting the above requirements. Such an endeavor
often results in a nal rule totaling several hundreds of pages in length.42
The Supreme Court's decision in Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gard-
ner43 was signicant not only because it adopted the doctrine of pre-enforcement
review of agency rules, but also because it spurred the development of \hard
look" review by the courts. Prior to that decision, the lawfulness of agency rules
could be challenged only in an enforcement action brought by an agency. Courts
typically reviewed rules based on the record developed during the agency's en-
forcement proceeding. Most rules were upheld under this procedure. After
Abbott Laboratories, most rules were subject to pre-enforcement review where
the reviewing court only had the rulemaking record before it on which to judge
the lawfulness of the rule. This new procedure forced courts to impose stringent
demands on agencies to compile rulemaking records that would adequately sup-
port their rules { records demonstrating the agencies' detailed consideration of
data disputes and other signicant comments, policy concerns, and reasonable
alternatives to the proposed rule contained in the comments.44 These demands
now constitute the \hard look" review requirements described above.
A further eect of Abbot Laboratories is that it creates additional dis-
incentive for agencies to promulgate rules beyond the disincentive created by
\hard look" judicial review. Even after an agency completes the lengthy and
tedious notice and comment process required by \hard look" review there is
42Davis and Pierce, supra note 27, at 310.
43387 U.S. 158 (1967).
44Pierce, supra note 3, at 88-89.
12no guarantee that the rule will go into eect because it might be challenged
in a pre-enforcement review action. Usually, a party challenging a rule will
move for a preliminary injunction to prevent the agency from implementing the
rule. If the plainti wins the preliminary injunction motion, the agency often
will abandon the rule entirely to avoid further litigation.45 An agency is less
likely to create policy through notice and comment rulemaking when there is no
guarantee that its rules can be implemented at the end of the day, especially in
light of the tremendous commitment of resources and time that promulgating
a rule now requires. An agency is more likely to turn to quicker and less costly
methods of policymaking such as case-by-case adjudication or even other less
formal methods of policymaking.
\Hard look" review appears to have substantial impacts on FDA rule-
making. The most notable is that FDA rulemakers must carefully review and
respond to all signicant comments received from the notice and comment pro-
cess in order to show that the nal rule has been rationally thought out. The
process can take several years especially in the case of a signicant regulation
where the FDA might receive thousands of comments. For example, one FDA
employee currently working on a proposed rule to amend the FDA's hearing aid
sales regulations stated that the FDA issued an advanced notice of proposed
rulemaking three years ago, receiving about 3,000 comments, and FDA employ-
ees are just nishing the review and analysis of those comments.46
45The FDA abandoned rules on numerous occasions under these circumstances. Telephone
Interview with Tom Scarlet, Partner at Hyman, Phelps, and McNamara in Washington D.C.,
and Chief Counsel to the FDA from 1981-1989 (January 14, 1997).
46Telephone Interview with Joseph Sheehan, Chief of the Regulatory Sta, FDA Center for
Devices (January 16, 1997).
13Others attest to the substantial dierences between rulemaking in the
early 1970's and present day rulemaking. For example, Mr. Richard Cooper,
Chief Counsel to the FDA from 1977-1979, noted that in the 1950's, there were
no substantial preambles47 to FDA regulations but by the mid-1970's, drafting
rules was \a lot of work" because of the need to carefully review the comments
and then write a detailed analysis justifying why the FDA considered or did
not consider each substantial comment in the FDA's nal rule.48 Another cur-
rent FDA employee, who has been involved in rulemaking for the last twenty
years, observed that FDA preambles have become \substantially longer" over
the years. In the early 1970's, preambles were generally short, consisting of a
paragraph or two highlighting the purpose of and justications for the rule. Now,
preambles have become \huge" primarily because the courts require greater re-
sponses to the comments.49
From these accounts, one can conclude that the rigors of judicial re-
view increase both the time and expense of FDA rulemaking.
III. Burdens Imposed by the Legislative Branch
The Congress also increased its interest in the rulemaking process during
47A preamble is simply an introductory summary of a regulation and contains statement of
the rule's basis and purpose.
48Telephone Interview with Richard Cooper, Partner at Williams and Connolly in Wash-
ington D.C., and Chief Counsel to the FDA from 1977-1979 (January 14, 1997).
49Telephone Interview with Edwin Dutra, Supervisory Consumer Safety Ocer, FDA Of-
ce of the Commissioner (January 15, 1997). Mr. Dutra specically cited the new tobacco
regulations as an example of how detailed and lengthy nal rules have become. See 61 Fed.
Reg. 44396 (August 28, 1996) (nal published regulations totaling over 200 pages).
14the same time that courts began to more strictly scrutinize rulemaking. Rules
for which compliance required tens or hundreds of millions of dollars of invest-
ment by industry at a time when high ination and interest rates burdened the
economy caught the attention of politicians and business leaders. As a result,
Congress began enacting statutes that required agencies to consider the eects
of their proposed rules and to include those eects in their calculi used to de-
termine the substance of their nal rules.50
This section summarizes the statutes passed by Congress since the
late 1960's that presently impact FDA rulemaking. These statutes place both
substantive and procedural burdens on the agency rulemaking process. The
majority of the statutes emphasize a specic area of Congressional concern and
mandate that agencies consider the substantive eects of their proposed rules
on those areas. As such, the statutes attempt to limit the discretion exercised
by agencies when they promulgate rules by specifying the types of informa-
tion administrators weigh in their rulemaking decisions. Further, each statute
species procedures with which agencies must comply when rulemaking. These
procedural mandates are in addition to those already required by the APA and
they act to slow down the rulemaking process.
National Environmental Policy Act
Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act (\NEPA")51 in
50Strauss, supra note 20, at 758.
5142 U.S.C. xx 4321 et seq. (1969).
151969 which directs agencies to consider the potential environmental impact of
their proposed rules where such rules may impact the quality of the environ-
ment. NEPA reects a national concern for the environment and it puts forth
procedural requisites to ensure agency consideration of environmental values
when formulating policy. Agencies must include in their proposals for \major
Federal actions signicantly aecting the quality of the human environment"52
an environmental impact statement (\EIS") addressing among other things, the
environmental impact of the proposed action, any adverse environmental eects
which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, and alternatives
to the proposed action.53 The Act requires that, prior to making the EIS for
a rulemaking, an agency consult with and obtain comments from any agen-
cies with jurisdiction or expertise with respect to any environmental impacts
at issue.54 Agencies must establish procedures to ensure that all rulemaking
decisions are made in accordance with the policies and objectives of NEPA,55
and those procedures must include procedures for assessing the need for an EIS
and for preparing and obtaining comments on the EIS.56 Each agency must de-
velop such procedures under the supervision of the Council on Environmental
Quality (\Council") which is also responsible for monitoring compliance with
52The Council on Environmental Quality created as part of NEPA, is responsible for adopt-
ing regulations setting forth uniform standards for conducting environmental reviews that are
binding on all agencies. Those regulations dene \major" as reinforcing but not having a
meaning independent of \signicantly". 40 C.F.R. x 1508.18. Those regulations dene \sig-
nicantly" according to the context and intensity of the environmental eects of the agency
action. 40 C.F.R. x1508.27.
5342 U.S.C. x4332(C).
54Id.
5540 C.F.R. x 1505.1
5640 C.F.R. x1507.3.
16the mandates of NEPA.57
There are no categories of FDA rulemaking which automatically re-
quire the preparation of an EIS because there are no categories of rulemaking
that necessarily have a signicant eect on the environment.58 The FDA pre-
pares an Environmental Assessment (\EA") for any proposed rule that it thinks
may signicantly aect the environment,59 provided that the category of rule
does not qualify for an exclusion from the EA requirement.60 The FDA then
evaluates the information in the EA to determine its accuracy and objectivity
and whether the potential eects of the proposed regulation warrant the prepa-
ration of an EIS.61 When the FDA determines that the preparation of an EIS
is necessary for a proposed rule, it publishes a Notice of Intent to prepare the
EIS in the Federal Register. FDA les a draft EIS with the Environmental
Protection Agency (\EPA") and sends drafts to parties having an interest in
the document. The FDA must also state in the notice of proposed rulemaking
that the EIS is available upon request and the FDA must solicit comments,
corrections, and additional information on the issues covered in the EIS from
57Id.
5821 C.F.R. x 25.21(a).
5921 C.F.R. x25.22(a)(19). One should note that there are certain categories of rulemaking
for which the FDA automatically prepares an EA such as promulgating regulations relating to
the control of communicable diseases and the interstate conveyance of sanitation. 21 C.F.R.
x25.22(a).
60See 21 C.F.R. xx 25.23 and 25.24 for exclusions from the EA requirement.
6121 C.F.R. x25.22(d). The EA is a public document which contains environmental and
other pertinent information regarding a proposed rule. The EA must provide a basis for the
FDA's decision whether to prepare an EIS or a Finding of No Signicant Impact (\FONSI")
and the analysis must be written so that the public can understand the FDA's decision. 21
C.F.R. xx 25.31(a) and (b). 21 C.F.R. xx 25.31a - 25.31e specify the formats of the EA for
various types of FDA actions. 40 C.F.R. x1502.10 provides detailed requirements for the
preparation of the EIS and the FDA follows that format unless it determines that there is a
compelling reason to do otherwise. 21 C.F.R. x 25.34.
17all interested parties.62 The FDA prepares the nal version of the EIS after re-
viewing comments on the draft EIS and the nal EIS receives full consideration
in the FDA's structuring of the nal rule.63
NEPA does not aect much FDA rulemaking because so many cate-
gories of rulemaking are exempt from the EA requirement under 21 C.F.R. xx
25.23 and 25.24. Even when the FDA prepares an EA, rarely does the process
result in a determination to prepare an EIS. In fact, the FDA has never pre-
pared an EIS for a rulemaking.64 However, preparing EA's does impact FDA
rulemaking to a certain degree because it is a task that the FDA takes seriously
and allocates time and resources towards.65
Some commentators argue that the major eect of the EIS requirement
has been to give environmental groups a means of delaying or enjoining agency
actions they oppose by challenging an agency decision not to prepare an EIS or
the adequacy of an EIS that the agency does prepare.66 However, this tactic
appears not to have had a major impact on FDA rulemaking.67
Regulatory Flexibility Act
Congress passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act68 (\RFA") in 1980 to
force agencies to consider the potential impact of their proposed regulations on
small business and other small entities such as small (not-for-prot) organiza-
6221 C.F.R. x 25.42(b).
6321 C.F.R. xx 25.42(a) and (b)(4).
64Dutra Interview, supra note 49.
65Id.
66Mashaw and Merrill, supra note 25, at 57-58.
67See Hutt and Merrill, supra note 8, at 1312 (\Nepa has occasionally been invoked by
parties opposing FDA action" and those attempts have proved largely unsuccessful).
685 U.S.C. xx 601-12 (1980).
18tions and small governmental jurisdictions.69 The RFA reects Congressional
concern about the impact of regulation, particularly environmental and health
regulation, on economic growth and the vitality of small business. It imposes
three types of burdens on agencies: the preparation of a regulatory agenda,70
the preparation of a regulatory exibility analysis for any proposed rulemaking
expected to have a signicant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities,71 and the periodic review of existing regulations to reevaluate the need
for any rules that signicantly aect a substantial number of small entities.72
The RFA requires each agency to prepare a regulatory exibility agenda
of rules that an agency expects to propose and are likely to have a signicant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.73 Each agency must
transmit the agenda to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business
Administration for comment.74 Further, each agency must publish its agenda
semi-annually in the Federal Register, bring each agenda to the attention of
small entities or their representatives, and invite comment on the agenda.75
The purpose of these requirements appears to be to allow small business and
other small entities the opportunity to inuence agency rulemaking decisions by
giving them access to agencies in advance of when agencies publish their notices
695 U.S.C. xx 601(3)-(6).
705 U.S.C. x 602.
715 U.S.C. xx 603-04.
725 U.S.C. x 610.
73The Act does not dene what constitutes a \signicant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities". However, at least one commentator has analyzed the legislative
history of the Act in an attempt to dene the intended parameters of that phrase. See Paul
R. Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 Duke L.J. 213, 242-247
(1982).
745 U.S.C. x 602(b).
755 U.S.C. x 602(c).
19of proposed rulemaking.
The RFA requires an agency to prepare an initial regulatory exibility
analysis describing the impact of its proposed rule on small business and small
entities each time it engages in notice and comment rulemaking. The analy-
sis must contain a description of any signicant alternatives to the proposed
rule that meet the objectives of the proposed regulation while minimizing the
economic impact of the proposed rule on small entities.76 The agency must
publish the analysis in the Federal Register along with the proposed rule and
the agency must give the analysis to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy.77 Further,
where a proposed rule will have a signicant economic impact, the agency \shall
assure that small entities have been given an opportunity to participate in the
rulemaking" through the use of techniques such as advance notice of proposed
rulemaking, direct notication to small entities of the proposed rule, and the
holding of public hearings or conferences.78
After the comment period on the proposed rulemaking closes, the
agency must prepare a nal regulatory exibility analysis which must respond to
issues raised by public comments regarding the initial analysis.79 The analysis
also must contain a description of each of the signicant alternatives to the rule
that meet the objectives of the nal rule while minimizing the economic impact
of the rule on small entities and a statement of the reasons why the agency
765 U.S.C. x 603(c).
775 U.S.C. x 603(a). One should note that an agency does not have to prepare the regulatory
exibility analysis if the head of the agency certies that the rule will not, if promulgated, have
a signicant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 5 U.S.C. x 605(b).
785 U.S.C. x 609.
79Id.; 5 U.S.C. x 604(a).
20rejected each alternative.80 The Act mandates consideration of regulatory al-
ternatives that are less expensive for small business and small entities for the
purpose of inuencing the substance of the nal agency rule. The agency is not
required to send the nal regulatory exibility analysis to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy, but it must either publish the analysis with the nal rule or make
the analysis available to the public on request.81
Under the original Act, the Chief Counsel for Advocacy oversaw agency
compliance with the regulatory exibility requirements. The Chief Counsel's
main enforcement mechanisms were publicity, the annual reporting to the Pres-
ident and Congress on agency compliance, and amicus appearances in court
challenges to agency rules.82 However, Congress amended parts of the RFA
as part of its Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act83 of 1996
(\SBREFA") because it found that federal agencies were not responsive enough
to small business concerns and had too often ignored the requirements of the
RFA.84
To remedy this problem, SBREFA (also discussed infra pp. 28-31) al-
lows small entities to seek judicial review of agency compliance with the RFA's
requirements.85 Such a challenge is a cause of action independent of a challenge
to the nal agency rule where the nal regulatory exibility analysis constitutes
805 U.S.C. x604(a).
815 U.S.C. x 604(b).
82Administrative Conference of the U.S., supra note 5, at 108-09. One should also
note that the nal regulatory exibility analysis constitutes part of the agency rulemaking
record for the purposes of judicial review. 5 U.S.C. x 611(c).
83Pub. L. No. 104-121, x201, 110 Stat. 847 (1996) [hereinafter SBREFA].
84See SBREFA x 202.
85Id. x 242. One should note that SBREFA makes other small changes in xx 603 and 604
of the RFA. However, the major change that aects how agencies deal with the requirements
of the RFA is the judicial review provisions added by SBREFA.
21part of the rulemaking record subject to judicial review. If a court nds an
agency to be out of compliance with the requirements of the RFA, the court
must order the agency to take corrective actions to comply with those require-
ments and must remand the rule to the agency and defer the enforcement of the
rule against small entities unless the court nds enforcement to be in the public
interest.86
Such a cause of action gives much more bite to the RFA and provides
incentive for agencies to adhere to its requirements. In fact, FDA personnel
believe that this amendment will impact the way the FDA and other agencies
approach rulemaking. Because of the threat of judicial review, the FDA must
make certain it does a thorough small entity impact analysis any time there is
a chance that one of its rules will aect small business and other entities.87
The Act also requires agencies to publish and implement a plan for
reviewing all existing rules on a ten-year cycle to minimize any signicant eco-
nomic impacts that existing rules might have on small business and small enti-
ties.88 The review must consider the continued need for the rule, the extent the
rule duplicates or conicts with other federal, state, or local regulations, and
any changes in technological or economic changes that occurred since the last
evaluation of the rule.89
86Id. x 242(a)(4).
87Telephone Interview with Larry Braslow, Director of the Economics Sta, FDA Oce of
Policy and Evaluation (January 17, 1997). Note that this is not a problem for \signicant"
rules as dened by Executive Order 12,866 since the FDA includes the regulatory exibility
analysis as part of the economic impact analysis required under that Order. However, there
are regulations that are not \signicant" under the Executive Order that can still substantially
aect small business and small entities. The FDA and other agencies must now take seriously
the regulatory impact analyses required for these rules.
885 U.S.C. x 610(a).
895 U.S.C. x 610(b).
22Paperwork Reduction Act
Congress enacted the Paperwork Reduction Act90 in 1980. The Act
reected Congressional concerns regarding the impact of regulation on economic
vitality similar to those that fueled passage of the RFA. The purpose of the Act
was to minimize the burden of ocial record-keeping and reporting requirements
necessary to comply with agency regulations. The Act required an agency to
rst obtain OMB approval before it could impose any new demands for infor-
mation on the private sector in a proposed rule. For executive agencies like
FDA, an OMB refusal to approve such a rule was nal. The Act's purpose was
to discourage new information demands and reduce the burden of regulatory
paperwork on industry.91
Congress recently passed the Paperwork Reduction Act of 199592 (\PRA")
to amend the old statute. The thrust of the statute remains unchanged but the
amendments substantially increase rulemaking burdens for agencies. First, the
PRA requires each agency to create an internal oce responsible for ensuring
agency compliance with the policies of the Act.93 The oce must establish a
process to evaluate fairly whether proposed collections of information should be
approved in light of PRA policies and review each proposed rule requiring a
collection of information before submission to OMB.94
Second, an agency conducting notice and comment rulemaking must
include its proposed collection of information as part of its notice of proposed
9044 U.S.C. x3501 et seq. (1980).
91Mashaw and Merrill, supra note 25, at 60.
92Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (1995) [hereinafter PRA].
93PRA x 3506(a).
94Id. x 3506(c)(1).
23rulemaking. The agency must solicit comment to evaluate whether the pro-
posed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency and to evaluate the agency's estimate of the burden of
the proposed collection of information.95
Further, for any proposed collection contained in a proposed rule, the
agency must submit a copy of the proposed rule containing the collection pro-
posal to OMB for review. The agency must certify that each collection of
information submitted for review (1) is necessary for the proper performance
of the functions of the agency; (2) reduces to the extent practicable the bur-
den on parties who will provide information to the agency;96 (3) informs those
who must submit information to the agency of the reasons the information is
being collected, the way the information will be used, and the estimated collec-
tion burdens on such parties;97 and (4) has been developed by an oce within
the agency that has planned and allocated resources for the ecient manage-
ment and use of the information to be collected.98 OMB may then le public
comments regarding the proposed collection within 60 days after the Federal
Register publishes the notice for proposed rulemaking.99 Within that time, if
OMB determines that the collection of information is unnecessary for any rea-
95Id. xx 3506(c)(2)(A) and (B).
96Especially with respect to small entities as dened in the RFA. The PRA encourages
agencies to consider alternative means of information collection from small entities such as es-
tablishing dierent compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into account
the limited resources of small entities. Id.
x 3506(c)(3).
97Id. x 3506(c)(1)(B)(iii).
98Id. x 3506(c)(3).
99Id. x 3507(d)(1). One should note that before approving a proposed collection of informa-
tion, OMB must determine whether the collection is necessary for the proper performance of
the functions of the agency. Before making such a determination, OMB may give the agency
and other interested parties an opportunity to be heard at a hearing or to submit statements
in writing airing their views. Id. x3508.
24son, the agency may not engage in the collection of information.100
Fourth, the agency may adopt a nal rule that includes a collection
of information if OMB does not nd the collection unnecessary, but the agency
must explain in the nal rule how the adopted collection of information re-
sponds to the comments led by OMB and the public or the reasons why the
agency rejected such comments.101 OMB, in its discretion, can disapprove any
collection of information contained in a rule if (1) the agency fails to comply
with the above requirements, (2) OMB nds within 60 days of publishing the
nal rule that the agency's response to OMB's comments about the proposed
collection are unreasonable, or (3) OMB determines that the agency has sub-
stantially modied in the nal rule the collection of information contained in
the proposed rule and the agency has not met the above requirements for the
modied collection of information.102
The PRA also provides that OMB may not approve a collection of
information for more than a period of three years.103 An agency must apply
for an extension of OMB approval of a particular collection of information by
conducting the same internal review of the collection and solicitation of public
comment regarding the collection as described above and then submitting the
collection of information to OMB for review. Such a submission should include
an explanation of how the agency has used the information that it has collected
100Id.
101Id. x 3507(d)(2).
102Id. x 3507(d)(4). One should also note that a decision by OMB to approve or not approve
a collection of information contained in an agency rule is not subject to judicial review. Id. x
3507(d)(6).
103Id. x 3507(g).
25under the rule in question.104 If OMB disapproves a collection of information
contained in an existing rule or recommends or instructs an agency to change the
collection contained in an existing rule, the agency must undertake a rulemaking
limited to consideration of changes to the collection of information contained
in the rule and then submit the modied collection of information to OMB for
approval or disapproval as described above.105
The PRA greatly impacts FDA rulemaking to the extent FDA at-
tempts to promulgate a rule imposing paperwork burdens on regulated parties.
Several months of work analyzing the paperwork burdens must be done before
publishing the proposed rule and submitting it to OMB for review. Then, the
FDA can spend many additional months considering comments received on the
proposed rule and drafting the nal rule. FDA personnel believe that Congress
passed this statute simply to create a roadblock to rulemaking because, in their
eyes, its only purpose is to slow down the rulemaking process. 106
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act107 (\UMRA") in
1995 to address the problem of enacting legislation and regulations that impose
costs on state, local, and tribal governments and does not also provide nancial
resources to those entities to pay the cost of compliance with the legislation or
regulations. Title II of the Act addresses agency rulemaking and requires an
104Id. x 3507(h).
105Id.
106Dutra Interview, supra note 49. FDA personnel also observe that the FDA largely ignored
the 1980 version of the Paperwork Reduction Act. However, the increased OMB oversight
role in the 1995 version of the Act has forced the FDA to adhere to the PRA's requirements.
Sheehan Interview, supra note 46.
107Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) [hereinafter UMRA].
26agency that promulgates a \signicant"108 rule to prepare a cost-benet analy-
sis of the rule.109 The analysis should include among other things the following:
the costs imposed on State, local, and tribal governments and the private sec-
tor and the health, safety, and environmental benets gained by the regulation,
including the extent to which the imposed costs may be paid with Federal -
nancial assistance and the extent to which there are available Federal resources
to pay for the mandate;110 estimates by the agency of the future compliance
costs of the mandate and any disproportionate budgetary eects that the man-
date may have on particular regions of the nation, particular state, local, or
tribal governments, or on particular segments of the economy;111 and estimates
by the agency of the eects of the mandate on the national economy such as
productivity, economic growth, and the production of jobs.112
The UMRA requires each agency to develop a plan to involve small
governments in the rulemaking process. The plan must include a means of
providing notice to small governments of agency plans to establish regulatory
requirements that may impose mandates on those governments, a means for
those ocials to provide meaningful input into the agency's development of
those requirements, and a means of informing, educating, and advising small
governments on compliance with those requirements.113 The UMRA also re-
108Dened as any regulation that may result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal
governments or by the private sector of $100,000,000 or more in any year. UMRA x 202(a).
109Id. One should note that this cost-benet analysis is similar to the one required under
Executive Order 12,866. As such, the analysis required under this Act can be prepared as
part of the Executive Order 12,866 economic impact analysis. Id. x 202(c). In fact, the FDA
typically prepares the UMRA analysis as a section of the impact analysis.
110Id. x 202(a)(2).
111Id. x 202(a)(3).
112Id. x 202(a)(4).
113Id. x 203.
27quires each agency to develop a process to permit elected ocials of State,
local, and tribal governments to provide meaningful input in the development
of regulations that may potentially impose signicant mandates on those gov-
ernments.114 Further, the UMRA requires an agency to identify and consider
a \reasonable number" of regulatory alternatives that achieve the objectives
of the desired rule. From these alternatives, the agency should select the least
burdensome rule for State, local, and tribal governments where the rule imposes
an intergovernmental mandate or for the private sector where the rule imposes
a private sector mandate.115
An agency must include in both its notice of proposed rulemaking
and its nal rule a written statement that includes the cost-benet analysis
described above and the extent of the agency's prior consultation with elected
representatives of the potentially aected State, local, and tribal governments.
The agency must present a summary of the comments and concerns that those
ocials expressed to the agency and the agency's evaluation of those comments
and concerns.116
The UMRA limits judicial review to an agency's failure to prepare
the written statement described above for the proposed or nal rule and an
agency's failure to develop a plan to involve small governments in the rulemak-
ing process. However, a court can only compel the agency to prepare the written
statement or plan; it cannot invalidate or enjoin a rule for an agency's failure
114Id. x 204.
115Id., x 205(a). This provision of the Act does not apply where the head of the aected
agency publishes with the nal rule an explanation of why the agency did not adopt the least
burdensome method of achieving the objectives of the rule. Id. x 205(b).
116Id. xx 202(a)(5) and (b).
28to adhere to these requirements. The principle means of ensuring that agen-
cies comply with the mandates of the Act is OMB and Congressional oversight.
OMB must submit an evaluation of agency compliance to Congress and include
in the evaluation agencies and rulemakings that fail to adequately comply with
the mandates of the UMRA.117
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
Subtitle E118 of SBREFA provides for Congressional review of agency
rulemakings. The import of this legislation is that it allows Congress to review
and disapprove of agency rules before they become eective whereas, before,
Congress could not pass legislation to overturn any agency rule it did not like
until after the rule was already in eect. SBREFA applies to all agency rules
as dened by x501 of the APA and therefore applies to interpretive rules and
policy statements issued by agencies even though those rules are exempt from
the notice and comment rulemaking process.
The Act requires an agency to supply Congress and the General Ac-
counting Oce (\GAO") with a report containing a copy of the rule, including
whether it is a \major" rule,119 and copies of all analyses made in the course
of rulemaking such as those required under the Executive Order 12,866, the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act.120 A rule
takes eect as otherwise provided under the law except in the case where the
117Id. x 205(c).
118SBREFA x251 (codied at 5 U.S.C. xx 801-08 (1996)).
119The Act denes a major rule as one that likely will have an annual eect on the economy
of $100,000,000 or more, a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, industry, or State
and local government agencies, or a signicant adverse eect on competition, employment,
investment, or productivity. 5 U.S.C. x 804(2). Note that this is similar to the denition of a
\signicant" rule under Executive Order 12,866.
1205 U.S.C. x 801(a)(1).
29rule is a major rule.121 Such a rule takes eect on the latest of (1) the date oc-
curring 60 days after the Congress receives the report from the agency described
above or after the Federal Register publishes the rule, (2) if the Congress passes
a joint resolution to disapprove the rule and the President vetoes the resolution,
the earlier date on which either House of Congress votes and fails to override
the veto or occurring 30 days after the Congress receives the veto; or (3) the
date the rule would have otherwise taken eect but not for this Act.122
The Act requires the GAO to provide to the relevant Congressional
committees an assessment of the agency's compliance with the procedural steps
required under the laws mentioned above within 15 days of receiving an agency's
rulemaking report.123 Within a period of time after receiving the GAO's as-
sessment, any appropriate committee in either the House of Representatives
or the Senate may generate a resolution of disapproval of the rule.124 If both
Houses of Congress adopt the resolution and the President signs the resolution
or the Congress overrides the President's veto, the rule ceases to have legal ef-
fect. Should that happen, SBREFA further stipulates that the agency loses its
authority to adopt a similar rule in the future unless authorized by new legisla-
tion.125
SBREFA purportedly creates political responsibility in the legislative
branch for agency rules having a signicant impact on the economy. This fol-
1215 U.S.C. x 801(a)(4).
1225 U.S.C. x 801(a)(3).
1235 U.S.C. x 801(a)(2).
124Note that x 802 of the Act provides the details of the Congressional disapproval process.
This paper does not discuss the intricacies of that process because they are beyond the scope
of the paper.
125Strauss, supra note 20, at 769.
30lows the pattern of increased executive branch scrutiny of agency rules described
below. SBREFA, for the rst time, also creates political responsibility for in-
terpretive rules and policy statements. Those rules are not even subject to the
notice and comment process mandated by x553 of the APA and therefore have
no democratic foundation whatsoever.
However, at least one commentator does not paint such a \rosy view"
of SBREFA and believes that it promises \to add further discouragement and ex-
pense to rulemaking at the agency level".126 First, the dynamic of the legislative
process and the size of statutory enactments makes it easy for special interest
to slip resolutions of disapproval into legislation, especially for non-major rules,
interpretive rules, and policy statements since these are not high-prole agency
actions.127
Second, the Act only adds a layer of Congressional review to the rule-
making process without diminishing any of the review burdens now imposed on
the rulemaking process. For example, SBREFA expressly prohibits a court from
considering any action taken by Congress under SBREFA in its review of an
agency rule.128 The Act therefore leaves in place \hard look" review which the
courts adopted because of the lack of political accountability in the rulemaking
process.129 With the increased review of agency rules by the political branches
of the government, one would think that Congress might restrict judicial review
of agency rules.130 Professor Strauss predicts that \these impacts, together with
126Id.
127Id. at 769-70.
1285 U.S.C. x 805.
129Strauss, supra note 20, at 770.
130Strauss, supra note 23 at 770.
31the uncertainties about rulemaking eectiveness introduced by the simple fact
of this process and the varying delays in eective date it may entail, will raise
the costs of rulemaking further", which, in turn, will discourage rulemaking by
agencies.131
The eect of Congressional review on the FDA rulemaking process is
unclear at this point in time. The Congressional review procedure is new and
FDA has not been able to assess its eects.132
IV. Burdens Imposed by the Executive Branch
The realization of the political importance of agency rulemaking in the early
1970's also increased Presidential interest in controlling the outcomes of the
rulemaking process, especially in light of the high ination and inter-
est rates that characterized the economic climate at that time.133 As suggested
by Professor Strauss, in light of the passage of NEPA which, for the rst time,
forced agencies to take into account potential environmental consequences of
their rules in the rulemaking process, \it was not hard for the White House to
see that it would also be useful for agencies to think forward about the possible
economic consequences of and justications for their major regulations".134
President Nixon's \Quality of Life" review was the rst executive over-
sight program for rulemaking. The program focused almost exclusively on EPA
131Id. at 772.
132Telephone Interview with William Shultz, Deputy Commissioner for Policy, FDA Oce
of Policy (January 17, 1997).
133Strauss, supra note 20, at 758.
134Id.
32rulemaking. The program required EPA to send a summaries of new rules
and possible alternatives to reviewing agencies like the Council on Wage and
Price Stability (\CWPS") which integrated comments and criticisms into the
rules and transmitted them back to EPA. The process sometimes extended the
rulemaking process for many months but had the perceived benecial eect of
bringing outside views of costs and alternatives to EPA.135
President Ford's Ination Impact Statement program focused on the
scal impact of agency rules. In Executive Order 11,821,136 Ford authorized
OMB to promulgate rules for determining whether a specic agency rule was
\major" with respect to its potential eect on the economy. The Order required
each agency to prepare an Ination Impact Statement analyzing the costs of each
major rule and submit it to OMB. Each statement had to contain an analysis of
costs and inationary eects of the rule compared to the benets to be derived
from the rule and a review of alternatives to the rule that the agency considered
when formulating the rule. The weakness of this program was that it was de-
centralized in that it left the primary responsibility of impact assessment to the
agencies and therefore would not inuence policy choices made by the agencies
as would a more external form of review.137
President Carter, under Executive Order 12,044,138 required agencies
to prepare regulatory analyses of proposed agency rules and submit those anal-
yses to OMB for review. For major regulations, the regulatory analysis had to
135Harold H. Bru, The Reagan Era in Retrospect: Presidential Management of Agency
Rulemaking, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 533, 546-47 (1989).
13639 Fed. Reg. 41501 (November 27, 1974).
137Bru, supra note 135, at 547.
13843 Fed. Reg. 12661 (March 23, 1978).
33contain a description of the problem the rule addressed, a description of the
alternative ways that the agency considered to deal with the problem, an anal-
ysis of the economic consequences of each alternative, and an explanation as to
why the agency chose the one alternative over the others. President Carter also
created the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (\RARG") which reviewed the
half dozen most important rules proposed each year. RARG issued comments
that the respective agencies were supposed to consider when drafting the nal
versions of those rules.139
President Carter also created the Regulatory Council whose primary
responsibility was to develop a Calendar of Federal Regulations which created
an \analytical synopses" of major rules being developed by various agencies
that were expected to substantially aect the economy. The Counsel used the
Calendar for regulatory planning by identifying relationships among proposed
rules from dierent agencies and coordinating plans to address interjurisdic-
tional regulatory issues.140
President Reagan initiated the most ambitious regulatory oversight program
of all. Executive Order 12,291141 required executive agencies to adhere to cost-
benet principles when promulgating regulations. Every agency had to prepare
a preliminary and a nal Regulatory Impact Analysis for all \major" rules
(those with a signicant impact on the economy) which had to contain the
projected costs and benets of the proposed rule, the expected net benets
139Bru, supra note 135, at 547-48.
140Id. at 548-49.
14146 Fed. Reg. 13193 (February 17, 1981).
34that would result from the regulation, and other potentially more cost-eective
alternatives to the proposed rule with an explanation as to why the agency
could not adopt the most cost-eective alternative. Further, the Order required
every agency to adhere to certain general principles when developing a rule
such as basing rulemakings on adequate information regarding the need for
and the consequences of a proposed rule, developing rules to address regulatory
priorities, and structuring rules to maximize net social benet by comparing
the costs and benets of a rule to viable alternatives to that rule. Every agency
had to submit each proposed major rule along with a preliminary Regulatory
Impact Analysis to OMB for review sixty days before the agency published its
notice of proposed rulemaking. The Order gave OMB the authority to require
an agency to refrain from publishing its notice of proposed rulemaking if there
were concerns about the preliminary impact analysis or the proposed rule.142
President Reagan also enacted Executive Order 12,498143 which established
a \regulatory planning process" whereby each executive agency head had to
submit to OMB a draft regulatory program summarizing the major rules the
agency expected to develop within the upcoming year. OMB had to review the
plans for consistency with administration policy and publish the plans. This
Order, along with Executive Order 12,291, gave appointed agency heads and
OMB more power over the early stages of the rulemaking process by reducing
the ability of entrenched agency sta to initiate the development of a major
142Bru, supra note 135, at 549-51.
14350 Fed. Reg. 1036 (January 4, 1985).
35agency rule without the consent of higher-level agency ocials.144
Executive Order 12,866
President Clinton promulgated Executive Order 12,866145 in 1993. It
imposes substantive and procedural rulemaking burdens on executive agencies
similar to those imposed by the Reagan executive orders. The Order rst es-
tablishes its \principles of regulation" as including, among other things, the
following: each agency must identify the problem that it intends to address
with a promulgating a rule; each agency will examine whether existing regu-
lations have contributed to the problem and whether those regulations should
be modied to correct the problem; each agency must assess available alterna-
tives to solving the problem apart from direct regulation; each agency must set
regulatory priorities and in doing so should consider the degree and nature of
risks within its jurisdiction; when an agency determines that direct regulation is
the best method of achieving the regulatory objective, it must design its rule in
the most cost-eective manner to achieve the regulatory objective; each agency
must assess the costs and benets of its intended regulation and must propose
or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the rules benets
justify its costs; and each agency must tailor its regulations to impose the least
burden on society, including individuals, businesses of diering sizes, and other
entities including small communities and governmental entities.146
144Bru, supra note 135, at 551. Note that this is the type of phenomenon that could occur
at an agency such as FDA where many of the sta are long-term employees and deeply believe
in the agency's mission. Proponents of this model of agency behavior perceive agency heads
to be captives of their own stas rather than politically powerful managers of their respective
agencies. Id.
14558 Fed. Reg. 51735 (September 30, 1993) [hereinafter Executive Order 12,866].
146Executive Order 12,866 x1(b).
36The Order then divides its regulatory management approach into three
principal parts. First, the Order establishes a regulatory planning mechanism
to (1) provide for the eective coordination of regulations, (2) maximize the
resolution of potential conicts at an early stage, (3) involve the public and
State, local, and tribal governments in regulatory planning, and (4) ensure that
new agency regulations promote the President's regulatory priorities.147
This part requires each agency to prepare a Regulatory Agenda de-
scribing all regulations under development or review as specied by the Oce
of Information and Regulatory Aairs (\OIRA").148 As part of the Agenda,
each agency must prepare a Regulatory Plan listing the most important \signif-
icant"149 proposed or nal rules that the agency expects to issue in the upcoming
scal year. Each agency head must approve the Plan which must contain the
following: a statement of the agency's regulatory objectives and how they re-
late to the President's priorities; a summary of each proposed or nal rule that
the agency expects to issue and alternatives to those rules as well as their pre-
liminary expected costs and benets of each rule; and a statement of the need
for each rule and how the rule will reduce risks to public health, safety, or the
environment, as well as how the magnitude of the risk addressed by the rule
relates to other risks within the jurisdiction of the agency.150 Each agency must
submit its Plan to OIRA for the purpose of coordinating regulatory plans of the
147Id. x4.
148Id. x4(b). Note that OIRA is part of OMB.
149Dened to include rules that may have one of the following eects: impose a cost on the
economy of $100,000,000 or more or adversely eect the economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety; interfere with a
regulation or action of another agency; or alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants,
user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof. Id. x3(f).
150Id. x4(c).
37various executive agencies. OIRA then annually publishes a Unied Regulatory
Agenda, which includes each agency's Regulatory Plan, and makes the Agenda
available to Congress, State, local, and tribal governments and the public so
that they can contact the specic agencies concerning any issues they might
have with any particular Plan.151
Second, the Order centralizes review of signicant proposed and nal
regulations similar to Reagan's rst executive order. The Order rst requires
each agency to provide to OIRA for review a list of its planned rulemakings
indicating those which the agency believes are signicant. The Order grants
OIRA authority to determine that a planned rulemaking not designated as sig-
nicant is in fact signicant.152
For each proposed rule designated by the agency or OIRA as signif-
icant, an agency must provide to OIRA the text of the draft regulation with
a summary of the need for the regulation and an explanation as to how the
proposed regulation promotes the President's priorities.153 Further, the agency
must provide (1) an assessment, including the underlying analysis, of the ben-
ets expected from the proposed rule and a quantication of those benets
where feasible,154 (2) an assessment, including the underlying analysis, of the
151Id. Note that making the Uniform Regulatory Agenda available for comment encourages
interested parties to negotiate rulemaking initiatives with the executive agencies before the
notice and comment procedure even begins. The purpose of this program appears to be
to develop a more consensus-oriented approach to regulation. The Order further enforces
the consensus-oriented approach to regulation by requiring agencies to explore consensual
mechanisms for developing regulations, including negotiated rulemaking. See Id. x6(a)(1).
152Id. x6(a)(3)(A).
153Id. x6(a)(3)(B).
154The Executive Order lists the ecient functioning of the economy and private markets,
the enhancement of health and safety, the protection of the environment, and the reduc-
tion or elimination of discrimination or bias as benets that might result from a rule. Id.
x6(a)(3)(C)(i).
38costs expected from the proposed rule and a quantication of those costs where
feasible,155 and (3) an assessment, including the underlying analysis, of the costs
and benets of potentially eective and reasonably feasible alternatives to the
proposed rule and an explanation why the proposed rule is preferable to those
alternatives.156 OIRA then has 90 days to review each submission to determine
whether the proposed rule is consistent with the President's priorities and the
principles of regulation described above. OIRA has the authority to return the
proposed rule to the issuing agency for further consideration of some or all of
its provisions but must provide a written explanation for returning the rule.157
An agency must also submit to OIRA for review each nal rule desig-
nated by the agency or OIRA as signicant. The agency must include the same
types of assessments with its nal rule submission as required for the proposed
rule submission described above. Again, OIRA has the authority upon review
to return the nal rule to the issuing agency for further consideration of some
or all of its provisions.158
155The Order lists the direct costs to both the government in administering the regulation and
business in complying with the regulation, and any adverse eects on the ecient functioning
of the economy, private markets, health, safety, and the environment as costs that might result
from a rule. Id. x6(a)(3)(C)(ii).
156Id. x6(a)(3)(C)(iii).
157Id. x6(b)(3).
158One should note that no agency action taken under this executive order or others described
below is subject to judicial review or has any bearing on the judicial review of a rule. Id. x10.
OMB oversight is the sole means of ensuring compliance with the provisions of the executive
orders. At rst blush it would seem that an agency that did not want to perform a cost-benet
analysis for a rule or wanted to ignore OMB concerns about the provisions of a rule could
simply ignore the executive order. However, as a practical matter, the dynamic between OMB
and the executive agencies precludes agencies from having that type of attitude about OMB's
rulemaking oversight. There is a strong sense of professionalism in public administration
where agency personnel appreciate the role of OMB as an executive agency representing the
views of the President. Agency personnel have an obligation to pay attention when OMB has
a concern about a rule and they usually act accordingly. If there is a real dispute among the
low level bureaucrats at the agency and OMB, the issue can escalate to the political appointees
at both the agency and OMB. At this level, personnel at both the agency and OMB know
that they are Presidential appointees and that they are there to serve the President. As
39Third, the Order requires agencies to establish and submit a program
to OIRA for the periodic review of existing signicant regulations to determine
whether the rules have become unjustied or unnecessary, to conrm that the
rules are compatible with each other and not duplicative in the aggregate, and
to ensure that the rules are consistent with the President's priorities and the
principles of regulation described above.159 When an agency selects a signicant
regulation for review, the agency must include that rule in its annual Regulatory
Plan for that year. The Order also requires an agency to identify any legislative
mandates that require the agency to promulgate or continue to impose rules
that the agency believes are unnecessary or outdated. The Order specically
encourages State, local, and tribal governments to assist in the identication of
regulations that impose signicant or unique burdens on them and that appear
no longer justied or otherwise inconsistent with the public interest.160
Based on anecdotal accounts from FDA employees, Executive Order
12,866 seems to signicantly impact FDA rulemaking. Those accounts, however,
reveal that OMB cost-benet review of rules has both positive and negative ef-
fects on the rulemaking process. For example, one employee who oversees most
of the economic impact analyses done for FDA rulemaking believes that analyz-
ing the eects of the rules is an educational exercise for the agency. Without a
cost analysis, the agency has no means or incentive to think through the steps
such, the appointees resolve the issue by determining what the outcome should be based on
the philosophy of the current administration's regulatory program. Telephone Interview with
Professor Christopher Edley, Jr., Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School, and Associate
Director for Economics and Government at OMB from 1993-1995 (January 19, 1997). One
should further note that OMB rulemaking oversight cuts down on rogue agency sta behavior.
See supra. note 144.
159Id. x5.
160Id. x5(a).
40that compliance will demand and the eects of such compliance on regulated
parties. The FDA has changed many rules after performing the economic anal-
yses because the agency realized that some provisions of its draft regulations
were unmanageable and overly burdensome.161 Further, as one FDA employee
suggested, the economic impact analysis requirement makes the agency think
more about the need of a particular rule. The requirement forces the FDA to
ask itself whether the rule is important enough to warrant the time and resource
commitment needed to do an impact analysis.162
On the other hand, economic impact analyses appear to be time-
consuming and expensive. For example, for the recently enacted food labeling
regulations,163 the economic impact analysis took a group of FDA economists
along with economists from an outside consulting rm a year to complete at
a cost of approximately $500,000.164 Similarly, an economic impact analysis
recently completed for a sh products processing rulemaking totaled over 100
pages and took over a year to compile.165 Further, some FDA personnel (as well
as many commentators) question whether OMB uses the cost-benet review as
a tool to produce better-focused and cost-eective regulations or as a means
of stagnating the rulemaking process by demanding that the FDA and other
agencies quantify the unquantiable expected benets of a regulation before
granting approval of the regulation.166
161Braslow Interview, supra note 87.
162Telephone Interview with Philip Spiller, Director of the Oce of Seafood, FDA Center
for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (January 16, 1997).
16358 Fed. Reg. 2066-2964 (June 6, 1993).
164Braslow Interview, supra note 87.
165Spiller Interview, supra note 162.
166Id.
41Other Executive Orders
There are additional executive orders that impose specic procedural
burdens on the rulemaking process for executive agencies. President Reagan
enacted Executive Order 12,606167 in 1987 which requires agencies to assess
the impact that their rules might have on family formation, maintenance, and
well-being. The Order establishes criteria that agencies should consider in their
assessments168 and requires each agency head to certify that each rule has been
analyzed in accordance with those criteria. OMB oversees compliance with the
Order. 169
President Reagan promulgated Executive Order 12,612170 in 1987 which
requires executive agencies to consider federalism principles when structuring
their rules. The Order mandates an agency to adhere to the \fundamental
federalism principles"171 when making a rule and for the agency to create a
Federalism Assessment whenever a rule is likely to have sucient federalism
implications. The Assessment must certify that the agency evaluated its rule in
light of the principles and purposes of the Order, identify any provision of the
16752 Fed. Reg. 34188 (September 9, 1987) [hereinafter Executive Order 12,606].
168Criteria include the following: does the rule strengthen or erode the stability of the family;
does the rule help the family perform its function, or does it substitute governmental activity
for that function; does the rule increase or decrease family earnings; do the proposed benets
of the action justify its impact on the family budget; and what message does the rule send to
young people concerning behavior and personal responsibility. Executive Order 12,606 x1.
169Id. x2.
17052 Fed. Reg. 41685 (October 26, 1987) [hereinafter Executive Order 12,612].
171The principles include, among other things, the following: federalism is rooted in the
knowledge that political liberties are best assured by limiting the size and scope of the federal
government; all sovereign powers belong to the States except those delegated to the federal
government in the Constitution; the nature of our constitutional system encourages a healthy
diversity in the public policies adopted by the people of the several States according to their
own conditions, needs, and desires; and that acts of the federal government cannot exceed
the enumerated powers of the federal government under the Constitution. Executive Order
12,612 x3.
42rule that is inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the Order, identify
the extent to which the rule imposes additional costs on the States, and iden-
tify the extent to which the rule might aect the discharge of traditional state
government functions.172 Every agency head must consider these Assessments
in all rulemaking decisions.173 The Order also provides that OMB has the au-
thority to \take action" to ensure that agency rulemakings are consistent with
the principles and requirements of the Order.174
President Reagan also enacted Executive Order 12,630175 in 1988 which
requires all executive agencies when developing regulations to consider Fifth
Amendment takings law so that agencies can avoid imposing regulatory burdens
that might constitute takings. The Order establishes \takings principles"176
and each agency that implements a regulation having takings implications must
adhere to those principles. Each agency must further make certain that any
restriction of private property is not disproportionate to the extent to which
the use of that property contributes to the overall regulatory problem. If the
restriction is to protect public health and safety, the agency should include in
any submissions to OMB (such as the economic impact analysis or Federalism
Assessment) a description of the public health or safety risk created by the pri-
172Id. x6(c).
173Id. x6(b).
174Id. x7(a).
17553 Fed. Reg. 8859 (March 15, 1988) [hereinafter Executive Order 12,630].
176The principles include, among other things, the following: agency ocials should be
sensitive to and account for the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment when
formulating regulations; actions undertaken by the federal government that result in physical
invasion or occupancy of private property or regulations that substantially aect the value or
use of private property may constitute a taking of property; and government actions taken
specically for purposes of protecting public health and safety are usually given broader lati-
tude by the courts before such actions are considered to be a taking. Executive Order 12,630
x3.
43vate property use, an explanation of how the rule advances the protection of
public health or safety, a showing that the regulation is not disproportionate to
the extent the use of the property contributes to the overall regulatory risk, and
an estimate of the cost to the government in the event that a court nds the
regulation to be a taking.177 Further, each agency must include in all required
rulemaking submissions to OMB the takings implications of a proposed rule and
the agency should also identify and discuss those implications in its notice of
proposed rulemaking.178 The Order authorizes OMB to \take action" to ensure
that agency rulemakings are consistent with the principles and requirements of
the Order.179
President Clinton enacted Executive Order 12,875180 in 1993 for the
purpose of reducing the imposition of unfunded mandates on State, local, and
tribal governments. Agencies must adhere to the provisions of this order as well
as those contained in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 discussed
above. The Order prohibits an executive agency from promulgating any regu-
lation that is not required by statute which creates a mandate upon a State,
local, or tribal government unless (1) the Federal government provides the funds
to pay for the mandate; or (2) the agency, prior to developing its regulation,
provides to OMB a description of the agency's consultation with State, local,
and tribal governments about the regulation, the nature of the concerns of those
entities and any written comments from those entities received by the agency,181
177Id. x2.
178Id. x5(b).
179Id. x5(e).
18058 Fed. Reg. 58093 (October 26, 1993) [hereinafter Executive Order 12,875].
181Executive Order 12,875 x1(a).
44and a statement of the need for the agency to issue the proposed rule in ques-
tion. The Order also requires each agency to develop an eective communication
process that enables representatives from State, local, and tribal governments
to provide input into the development of rules that create signicant unfunded
mandates.182
Lastly, President Clinton promulgated Executive Order 12,988183 in
1996 for the purpose of improving access to courts and administrative tribunals
for all persons wishing to resolve disputes grounded in administrative regu-
lations. The Order establishes principles184 that agencies must follow when
promulgating rules in order to reduce the litigation burden on the courts. Fur-
ther, the Order instructs an agency to review each proposed rule and nal rule
to ensure, among other things, that the rule species its preemptive eect and
its eect on existing laws and regulations, provides a clear legal standard for
aected conduct, species its retroactive eect, and species whether adminis-
trative proceedings are required before a party can le a suit in court under the
rule.185
V. The Eects on FDA Rulemaking
The principle concern is determining what eect the cumulative burden the
182Id. x1(b).
18361 Fed. Reg. 4729 (February 5, 1996) [hereinafter Executive Order 12,988].
184The principles include, among other things, the following: the agency should review all
rules for drafting errors; the agency should write rules to minimize litigation; and the rule
should provide a clear legal standard for aected conduct rather than a general standard.
Executive Order 12,988 xx 3(a) and (b)(2).
185Id. x3(c).
45various rulemaking requirements has on the FDA rulemaking process. The
hypothesis underlying this paper is that the cumulative burden deters FDA
rulemaking and increases the number of situations where rulemaking is not a
viable method of regulation. Unfortunately, there is no practical way to quantify
the eects that the requirements have on FDA rulemaking either individually
or cumulatively. Further, no one appears to have compiled empirical data on
this question.186 This analysis therefore uses anecdotal accounts to support the
above hypothesis.
The most compelling accounts are those of Tom Scarlet187 who was
Chief Counsel of the FDA from 1981-1989. In a telephone interview, he stated
that he could verify the truth of this paper's hypothesis that the procedural re-
quirements have substantially burdened FDA rulemaking. The burdens began
increasing in the beginning of the 1970's with the transformation of judicial re-
view of agency rulemaking and continued into the 1980's with OMB cost-benet
review of rules, all of which made rulemaking dicult.
Mr. Scarlet cited an \invisible" burden as having one of the greatest
impacts on the rulemaking process; namely, review of FDA proposed and nal
rules by the Department of Health and Human Services (\HHS").188 As Mr.
Scarlet explained, HHS became involved in FDA rulemaking when OMB began
186Telephone Interview with David Plocher, Minority Counsel, Senate Government Aairs
Committee (January 21, 1997); Telephone Interview with Gary Bass, Executive Director,
OMB Watch (January 17, 1997); Telephone Interview with David Vladeck, Litigation Attor-
ney, Public Citizen (January 15, 1997).
187See supra note 47.
188Note that HHS promulgated a regulation stating that the Secretary of HHS \reserves the
authority to approve [FDA] regulations" which create rules governing a class of products or
address important public policy issues. 21 C.F.R. x 5.11; Hutt and Merrill, supra note 8,
at 1245.
46its oversight of executive agency rulemaking, and is concerned especially with
the cost-benet review of proposed and nal agency rules. As a political mat-
ter, HHS did not want anything going to OMB from its sub-agency without rst
reviewing it. As a result, the FDA had to send all proposed and nal agency
rules to the Oce of the Assistant Secretary of Health for review before the
rules could be sent to OMB.189
According to Mr. Scarlet, the layer of HHS review had a dramatic
eect on the rulemaking time line. HHS frequently sent rules back to FDA for
changes before it allowed the FDA to send them to OMB. HHS review often
took months or even a year to complete. Delays sometimes extended the review
process for more than a year. Moreover, each rule had to go through HHS review
twice, once as a proposed rule and once as a nal rule; thus, often extending
FDA rulemaking by two to three years. The political price of HHS review was
also high. FDA ocials had to placate HHS ocials to get a proposed or nal
rule through HHS quickly. This meant that FDA had to compromise on the
substance of its rules without any real debate or negotiation in order to avoid
conict with HHS ocials.
The delay and the political toll both provided further disincentive to
engage in rulemaking. In the early 1970's, judicial review was not as demand-
ing and there was no HHS or OMB review. The picture was far dierent in the
1980's. Publishing the notice of proposed rulemaking could take a year or two
because both of HHS and OMB review of the proposed rule. Writing the nal
189This was the structure of the HHS review process in the 1980's when Mr. Scarlet worked
at the FDA. This analysis assumes that the same review structure still exists.
47rule could take a year or two because FDA had to review and respond to each
signicant comment to satisfy judicial requirements. Publishing the nal rule
could take another year or two because of a second review by both HHS and
OMB. Finally, if there was a pre-enforcement challenge to a rule, the courts tied
up the rule for another year or two before it could become eective. In total, it
took an additional ve years or more for FDA to promulgate a rule because of
the burdens added to the rulemaking process in the 1970's and 1980's.
Mr. Scarlet gave two examples where HHS review caused FDA rule-
making to stagnate. First, in the early 1980's, FDA wanted to establish a new
drug approval system. FDA sent its proposed regulation to HHS but could
not convince HHS to send the rule to OMB because HHS economists and man-
agement analysts kept reviewing and changing parts of the rule. The proposal
never left HHS. Instead someone leaked it to Capitol Hill and the proposed rule
became part of the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Law. Congress took about one year
to pass that legislation. Mr. Scarlet speculated that had Congress not gotten
involved, FDA would not have been able to implement its regulation until the
1990's. Second, in the late 1980's FDA began promulgating a new food labeling
regulation. Again, HHS review tied up FDA's proposed rule. Finally, Congress
got involved and passed the 1990 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, again
incorporating many of the provisions contained in FDA's proposed regulation.
Mr. Scarlet again speculated that had Congress not involved itself in this mat-
ter, the new food labeling regulations would still not exist.190
190Mr. Scarlet does not think that HHS and OMB oversight tie down every FDA regulation.
He stated that rules get through the reviews process quickly if external political pressures
48Joseph Sheehan, Chief of the Regulatory Sta in the FDA's Center for
Devices, also presented a compelling account of the eects that these procedural
burdens have had on the FDA rulemaking process.191 The rst project that Mr.
Sheehan worked on upon joining FDA in 1976 was a rulemaking for regulating
the sale of hearing aids. That rule essentially requires that a hearing aid dis-
penser not sell a hearing aid unless the prospective user has a written statement
from a physician conrming that person's hearing loss and need for a hearing
aid. The rule contains a waiver provision whereby the user can waive the re-
quirement of the physician statement if the dispenser believes that a waiver is in
the user's best health interest. 192 According to Mr. Sheehan, less than a year
elapsed between the time the FDA published the notice of proposed rulemaking
and the nal rule.
Currently, the FDA is trying to amend the hearing aid sales regulation
to eliminate the personal waiver provision because FDA investigations uncov-
ered that 80%-90% of users were waiving the physician statement requirement
due to misleading encouragement by hearing aid dispensers. The FDA pub-
lished an advance notice of proposed rulemaking three years ago and has yet to
publish its notice of proposed rulemaking. FDA received over 3,000 comments
from the advanced notice which FDA must review and respond to in its notice
of proposed rulemaking to satisfy judicial notice requirements. Further, FDA
has to complete its economic impact analysis for OMB as well as assessments
drive the rulemaking. Most review problems occur when FDA initiates the rulemaking under
its own discretion. Scarlet Interview, supra note 45.
191Sheehan Interview, supra note 46.
192See 21 C.F.R. x 801.421.
49required by the Paperwork Reduction Act and the Unfunded Mandates Act
before it can publish the notice of proposed rulemaking. The FDA hopes to
publish the notice of proposed rulemaking this year. Mr. Sheehan expects that
there will be a delay of at least a few more years before the FDA can publish
its nal rule. This account demonstrates that what once took a year or two to
complete in the 1970's now requires an investment of ve or six years because
of the increased burdens on the rulemaking process.
The above anecdotes and other accounts contained in the Parts II,
III, and IV of this paper illustrate the time-consuming and expensive nature
of the burdens on FDA rulemaking, substantially lowering its value as a fea-
sible method of policymaking. First, time cycles become a problem. Many of
the FDA-regulated industries are technologically sophisticated; new regulatory
issues arise in those industries with every new technological advancement. Ar-
guably, rulemaking has become an impractical means of regulating those areas
for two reasons. One is that an urgent regulatory issue that needs to be solved
within a year cannot be solved by a rulemaking that takes ve or more years to
complete. The second is that even if a regulatory issue does not need immediate
attention, by the time the FDA completes a rulemaking to address that issue,
the rule may be moot. Such would be the case if a technological change negates
the original issue and creates a second issue that the rule is not designed to
address. The probability that either of these scenarios will occur increases as
the rulemaking process takes longer to complete.
Rulemaking also has become increasingly expensive. The burdens de-
50scribed throughout this paper require the FDA to allocate far more resources
towards rulemaking in the 1990's as compared to what was required in the early
1970's. For example, the FDA had to hire an economic sta to deal with the
analyses required under the Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order
12,866,193 and environmental experts to deal with the environmental assess-
ments required under NEPA.194 Moreover, the FDA must devote personnel and
resources to the task of reviewing and addressing comments received during the
notice and comment process. This task often takes years,195 and those assigned
to it cannot work on other projects. The FDA must therefore hire additional
personnel to handle the residual workload. The current expense of rulemaking
makes it an increasingly untenable form of policymaking for the FDA in to-
day's political climate where government agencies face ever-increasing budget
constraints. In short, the developing trend is that the FDA cannot aord to
continue to use rulemaking as its principle means of policymaking.
The above anecdotes and arguments support the hypothesis that the
burdens of rulemaking deter the FDA from using rulemaking as a regulatory
instrument. Assuming that the hypothesis is true, one must determine the
method of regulation the FDA uses in place of rulemaking. Further investiga-
tion may reveal that the FDA has turned to the use of guidance196 to ll the
policymaking void left in the absence of rulemaking.
193Braslow Interview, supra note 87.
194Dutra Interview, supra note 49.
195See, e.g., Sheehan Interview, supra note 46.
196Supra note 3.
51VI. Conclusion
The burdens imposed on agency rulemaking by \hard look" judicial review,
NEPA, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Un-
funded Mandates Act, and the various executive orders, especially Executive
Order 12,866, have led to the \ossication" of rulemaking at the FDA. The
threat of Congressional review imposed by SBREFA only serves to exacerbate
this phenomenon. As a result, the FDA probably no longer uses rulemaking as
its principle method of policymaking. This paper suggests that the FDA now
uses informal guidance as a substitute for rulemaking.
Such a trend is problematic for several reasons. First, there are con-
cerns about whether the FDA uses a guidance as an informational tool or as
a de facto rule. A frequent complaint by industry is that the FDA enforces
guidance statements as if they were legally binding rules.197 For example, the
FDA sends a letter notifying a company about steps it should take to comply
with a particular Good Manufacturing Practice (\GMP") regulation. If the
company does not change its practices as suggested by the guidance letter, the
FDA inspector might shut down the company's manufacturing operations for
being out of compliance with the GMP. Arguably, this practice is illegal because
the FDA treats the guidance as a rule but did not promulgate it using notice
and comment procedures as required by the APA.
Second, the FDA exercises great discretion when it regulates using
197Telephone Interview with Nancy Buc, Partner at Buc and Beardsley in Washington D.C.,
and Chief Counsel to the FDA from 1980-1981 (January 23, 1997); Telephone Interview with
Bradley Thompson, Partner at Baker and Daniels in Indianapolis, IN (October 19, 1996).
52guidance. One of the functions of rulemaking is to control an agency's discre-
tion by developing rules that legally bind agencies to act in a specic way and
follow stated policies. Without rulemaking, there is no way to control potential
abuses of discretion by the FDA.
Third, rules inform regulated parties as to how they should behave
under the law, whereas a regime of informal regulation has no clearly dened
modes of behavior. The use of guidance creates uncertainty for regulated par-
ties who must guess as to how to behave within the law. This uncertainty is
also bad for the public interest because, without rules, regulated entities have
diculty self-regulating and may therefore engage in socially harmful behavior.
This paper is the rst part of a broader investigation into the FDA's
current use of guidance as a regulatory tool. This paper demonstrates that
rulemaking has become increasingly burdensome for the FDA over the past
twenty-ve years and hypothesizes that this has caused the FDA to increase its
use of guidance as an alternative to rulemaking. Future work will explore the
FDA's current use of guidance, and will analyze the problems caused by its use,
and their potential solutions.
53